Total Deleted Page(s) = 16
Page 17 ~ b1; b3;
Page 18 ~ b1; b3;
Page 19 ~ b1; b3;
Page 36 ~ Duplicate;
Page 37 ~ Duplicate;
Page 38 ~ Duplicate;
Page 39 ~ Duplicate;
Page 41 ~ b1; b3;
Page 45 ~ b1; b3;
Page 48 ~ b1; b3; b7E;
Page 51 ~ b1; b3; b7E;
Page 82 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 83 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 84 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 85 ~ b7E;
Page 86 ~ b6; b7C; b7E;

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X Deleted Page(s) X
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X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
To: (CD) (FBI) | (WF) (FBI) | (JN) (FBI) | (OQ) (FBI)  
Cc: (CD) (FBI) | (WF) (FBI) | (CG) (FBI) |  
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna---  

Hello I returned to Vienna last Saturday  

Records...  
Legat Vienna  

From: LkVN) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 3:43 PM  
To: (VN) (FBI) | (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: (CD) (FBI); (CG) (FBI); (JN) (FBI); (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna  

Not a problem.  
Thanks again.  
UC: Room 4133  

--- Original Message ---  
From: (VN) (FBI)  
Sent: Monday, March 27, 2006 2:39 AM  
To: (CD) (FBI) | (WF) (FBI)  
Cc: (CD) (FBI); (CG) (FBI); (JN) (FBI); (WF) (FBI)  
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna  

Hello The delay is ok. I am on Seattle inspection from 4/1-15/06.  

Please cc my Acting ALAT on any future traffic. She will be in Vienna while I am on inspection. Thanks.  
Legat Vienna
Many Thanks.

I really appreciate your recommendations.

Thanks for your help!

See my last email. I will be out of town. But we can arrange it.
Correction: The case Agent would need additional time to prepare. The end of next week would be better. (March 30th - 31st) or any time after these dates. Please advise. Thanks!

A/ASAC
Office:
Cell:

-----Original Message-----
From: (WF) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 7:48 AM
To: (VN) (FBI)
Cc: (CD) (FBI); (WF) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna

SECRET
RECORD

Please advise. Thanks!

A/ASAC
Office:
Cell:

-----Original Message-----
From: (VN) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, March 21, 2006 7:30 AM
To: (WF) (FBI)
Cc: (CD) (FBI); (WF) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Lead for Vienna

SECRET
RECORD

Regards,
Legal Vienna

From: (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 1:09 PM
To: (VN) (FBI); (OIO) (FBI)
Cc: (CD) (FBI); (WF) (FBI); (OIO) (FBI); DESLAURIERS, RICHARD (CD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna
This is good news. Thanks again. We have the benefit of having [name] at WFO and [name] from my Unit who have been involved in this case from the get go. Their institutional knowledge of this case has made it easy for us at HQ.

Thanks again for your continued support of this case. Regards,

UC
Room 4133

---Original Message---
From: [name] (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2006 4:57 AM
To: [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI);
Cc: [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI); [name] (FBI)
Subject: RE: Lead for Vienna

Hello [name], Legat Vienna is pleased to support HQ/WFO in this investigation.

Thank you for your assistance.

Regards,

Legat Vienna

From: [name] (FBI)
Thank Legat Vienna for the continued support and with the expeditious handling of this lead. I am on inspection but can address e-mail as they come in. Many Thanks.

UCI Room 4133

Legat Vienna
<< File: cp06058a.ec >>

Subject: Lead for Vienna
The attached is serial If Vienna has any questions, please call me at (non-secure, with voice mail) or (secure, no voice mail). The hard copies were mailed out today.

Thanks,

WFO (new squad designator due to this week's reorganization at WFO)

<< File: cp06058a.ec >>

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

DERIVED FROM: G-3 FBI Classification Guide G-3, dated 1/97, Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations
DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET

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DECLASSIFICATION EXEMPTION 1
SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 04/21/2006
To: Washington Field Attn: SSA
From: Counterintelligence
Contact: IA/OS Room 4133

Approved By: 
Drafted By: 
Case ID #: (S) (Pending)
Title: (X) UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopsis: (X) FBIHQ notes receipt of

Details: (X) On January 12, 2006,

Point of contact in this matter is IA/OS (secure), Room 4133, secure facsimile

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG F54M93K42
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2031
DATE: 01-20-2016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
SECRET/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 05/12/2006

To: Washington Field
Attn: SSA

From: Counterintelligence
Room 4133
Contact: IA/OS

Approved By: [Signature]

Drafted By: [Signature] (ced)

Case ID #: [S] (Pending)

Title: 
UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopsis: 

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 25X1

Details: (U) FBIHQ authority is granted for

SECRET/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SEARCHED INDEXED FILED

JUN 09 2006

Classified by: NSICG F54M93K42
Reason: 1.4 (C)
Declassify On: 12-31-2031
Date: 01-20-2016

All information contained herein is unclassified except where shown otherwise
To: Washington Field
From: Counterintelligence
Re: (S) 05/12/2006

Point of contact in this matter is IA/OS (secure), Room 4133, secure facsimile

*****
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/12/2006
To: Washington Field Attn: SSA

From: Counterintelligence

Contact: IA/OS

Approved By: 

Drafted By: ced

Case ID #: (S) (Pending)

Title: (S) UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

 Derived From: G-3

Declassify On: 25X1

Reference: (S)

SECRET//NOFORN//25X1

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG F54M93K42
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2031
DATE: 01-20-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
To: Washington Field  From: Counterintelligence  
Re: (S)  05/12/2006  

(S) Point of contact in this matter is IA/OS (secure), Room 4133, secure facsimile

***
UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopis: (S) [Pending] Derived From: G-1

Declassify On: X1
To: Counterterrorism  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  05/30/2006

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

Read and clear

SECRET
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/16/2006

To: Security
   Counterintelligence
   Washington Field
Attn: AD
Attn: UC
Attn: 

From: Rome
   Legat
   Contact: 

Approved By:
Drafted By:

Case ID #: (S) (Pending) 

Title: (S) IRAQ/NIGER
   PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Synopsis: 

(U) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 06/16/2026

(U) Details: 

(S) This portion of the briefing was classified Secret.

ASSIGNED TO

SA
SQUAD
DATE 7/24/2004

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG F54M93K42
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2031
DATE: 01-20-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
To: Security  From: Rome
Re: (S) [Redacted] 06/16/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

**

SECRET

2
UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

in conjunction with captioned investigation.

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 25X1

The Counterintelligence Division, (Global) Section is

ASSIGNED TO

SA
SQUAD
DATE: 01-20-2016
To: Counterintelligence
From: Counterintelligence
Re: (S) 06/28/2006

(WFO intends to [redacted])

Point of contact in this matter is IA/OS [redacted], Room 4133, secure facsimile [redacted].
To: Counterintelligence  From: Counterintelligence
Re: (S)  06/28/2006

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) The Counterintelligence Division, is requested to

**

SECRET
Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 08/02/2006

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dmh

Case ID #: (S) (Pending)

Title: [UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopsis: To request that the abovementioned cases be assigned a co-case agent.

Details: Writer requests that SA be assigned as the Co-case Agent for the above captioned cases. SA is extremely familiar with the details of the cases. The captioned cases will require additional Agent support due to multiple work assignments that will need to be simultaneously addressed. Writer has previously tasked SA

***

SECRET/NOFORN

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICO F54N93K42
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2031
DATE: 01-20-2016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 06/26/2006
To: Counterintelligence Attn: Asia/Near East, Room 4133

From: Washington Field Squad
Contact: SA

Approved By: 
Drafted By: dmh

Case ID #: (S) (Pending) (S)

Title: (X) UNSUB(S); SUBJECT FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO US GOVERNMENT

Synopsis: (X) To request that FBIHQ provide a

Decon declassified X

Details: (U) The purpose of this communication is to request that

WFO intends to

(b7E)

SECRET
As background, captioned investigation was predicated on a 03/14/2003 letter from U.S. Senator John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to FBI Director Mueller to request an investigation. Summary of the letter as follows: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently determined that some of the intelligence documents provided to it by the United States are forgeries. These documents were provided to the IAEA as evidence of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from the Republic of Niger. While U.S. concerns regarding alleged Iraqi nuclear weapons development programs have not been based primarily on these forgeries, there is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq. Hence, I believe it is important to ascertain the following: the source of the documents; the level of sophistication of the forgeries; the motivation of those responsible for the forgeries; why the Intelligence Community did not recognize the documents were fabricated; and the extent to which these forgeries may be part of a larger disinformation campaign.
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  06/26/2006

(S) WFO requests that FBIHQ

SECRET
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  06/26/2006

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

[U] WFO respectfully requests that Counterintelligence

**
Precedence: ROUTINE  
Date: 09/13/2006

To: Washington Field  
Attn: 

From: Washington Field  
Contact: SA 

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

dmh 

Case ID #: (S) 

(Pending)

Title: (X) UNSUB(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO US GOVERNMENT

Synopsis: (U) To set lead for translation of newspaper articles published in April of 2006 regarding captioned case.

(X)(U) Derived From: G-1  
Declassify On: XL

Reference: (S) 

Attachment(s): (U) Three (3) Italian newspaper articles.

Details: (U) is requested to translate the attached documents. The translation request consists of a full translation of three (3) Italian documents which are unclassified. These documents were obtained by Legat Rome and forwarded to WFO.

(S) The documents will not be attached to the copy of this EC to the captioned file, as the original documents are already submitted to the file in serial
LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON DC

(U) is requested to translate the attached documents. The translation request consists of a full translation of three (3) Italian documents which are unclassified.
To: Counterintelligence

Date: 11/02/2006

Attn: Gerald R. Rose,
Global Section
Rm. 4133

Attn: Michael Welch
A/SC
UC
SSA
SSA
Rm. 4133
Europe

Attn: ASAC

From: Rome

Contact:

Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
POSSIBLE PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT;
FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING IRAQI EFFORT
TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER
FCI - PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Derived From: G-3

DECLASSIFY ON: X1

ASSIGNED TO
SA
SQUAD
DATE 11/6/2007

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICO
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12/31/2031
DATE: 01-20-2016

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
To: Counterintelligence  From: Rome
Re: (S)  11/02/2006

(U) There are no pending leads at Legat Rome; as such, Legat Rome will conduct no further investigation on this matter. Legat Rome considers this matter referred upon completion (RUC'd).
To: Counterintelligence  From: Rome
Re: (S) 11/02/2006

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1:  (Info.)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) For information. Read and clear.

**
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS
POSSIBLE PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT;
FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING IRAQI EFFORT TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER;
FCI - PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

Deriv ed From: G=3
Declassify On: X1
To: Counterintelligence  From: Rome
Re: (S) ______________________________________  12/05/2006

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

ALL RECEIVING OFFICES

(U) Read and clear.

++

SECRET/NOFORN
UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Requests FBIHQ authority to

Derived From: G-3
Declasify On: X1

FBIHQ is requested to grant authority to

SECRET
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  12/11/2006

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[U] is requested to grant authority to

**
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Counterintelligence

Attn: IA

From: Washington Field

Contact: SA

Approved By: OFS

Drafted By: cmhl

Case ID #: (S)

Title: (S) UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER;
FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopsis: (X) Requests FBIHQ authority to

(X) Derived From: G=3
Declassify On: X1

Details: (S) FBIHQ is requested to grant authority to
To: Counterintelligence
From: Washington Field
Re: (S) [Redacted] 12/11/2006

LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
AT WASHINGTON, DC

[Redacted] is requested to grant authority [Redacted]

**
UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER; FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

FBIHQ authority is granted for

Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: 25X1

FBIHQ authority is granted for
To: Washington Field
From: Counterintelligence
Re: (S) [Redacted] 01/19/2007

(S) This authority is granted

(U) Point of contact in this matter is IA/OS [Redacted] (secure), Room 4133, secure facsimile

**
The Story That Didn’t Run

Here’s the piece that ‘60 Minutes’ killed for its report on the Bush documents

WEB EXCLUSIVE

By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated: 5:24 p.m. ET Sept 22, 2004

Sept. 22, 2005 - In its rush to air its now discredited story about President George W. Bush’s National Guard service, CBS bumped another sensitive piece slated for the same “60 Minutes” broadcast: a half-hour segment about how the U.S. government was snookered by forged documents purporting to show Iraqi efforts to purchase uranium from Niger.
The journalistic juggling at CBS provides an ironic counterpoint to the furor over apparently bogus documents involving Bush’s National Guard service. One unexpected consequence of the network’s decision was to wipe out a chance—at least for the moment—for greater public scrutiny of a more consequential forgery that played a role in building the Bush administration’s case to invade Iraq.

A team of “60 Minutes” correspondents and consulting reporters spent more than six months investigating the Niger uranium documents fraud, CBS sources tell NEWSWEEK. The group landed the first ever on-camera interview with Elisabetta Burba, the Italian journalist who first obtained the phony documents, as well as her elusive source, Rocco Martino, a mysterious Roman businessman with longstanding ties to European intelligence agencies.

Although the edited piece never ended up identifying Martino by name, the story, narrated by “60 Minutes” correspondent Ed Bradley, asked tough questions about how the White House came to embrace the fraudulent documents and why administration officials chose to include a 16-word reference to the questionable uranium purchase in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union speech.

But just hours before the piece was set to air on the evening of Sept. 8, the reporters and producers on the CBS team were stunned to learn the story was being scrapped to make room for a seemingly sensational story about new documents showing that Bush ignored a
direct order to take a flight physical while serving in the National Guard more than 30 years ago.

The story has since created a journalistic and political firestorm, resulting in a colossal embarrassment for CBS. This week, the network concluded that its principle source for the documents, a disgruntled former Guard official and Democratic partisan named Bill Burkett, had lied about where he got the material. CBS anchor Dan Rather publicly apologized for broadcasting the faulty report. Today, CBS named a two-person team comprised of former U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and former Associated Press chief Louis Boccardi to investigate the network's handling of the story.

"This is like living in a Kafka novel," said Joshua Micah Marshall, a Washington Monthly contributing writer and a Web blogger who had been collaborating with "60 Minutes" producers on the uranium story. "Here we had a very important, well-reported story about forged documents that helped lead the country to war. And then it gets bumped by another story that relied on forged documents."

Some CBS reporters, as well as one of the network's key sources, fear that the Niger uranium story may never run, at least not any time soon, on the grounds that the network can now not credibly air a report questioning how the Bush administration could have gotten taken in by phony documents. The network would "be a laughingstock," said one source intimately familiar with the story.

Although acknowledging that it was "frustrating" to have his story bounced, David Gelber, the lead CBS producer on the Niger piece, said he has been told the segment will still air some time soon, perhaps as early as next week. "Obviously, everybody at CBS is holding their breath these days. I'm assuming the story is going to run until I'm told differently."

The delay of the CBS report comes at a time when there have been significant new developments in the case—although virtually none of them have been reported in the United States. According to Italian and British press reports, Martino—the Rome middleman at the center of the case—was questioned last week by an Italian investigating magistrate for two hours about the circumstances surrounding his acquisition of the documents. Martino could not be reached for comment, but his lawyer is reportedly planning a press conference in the next few days.

Burba, the Italian journalist, confirmed to NEWSWEEK this week that Martino is the previously mysterious "Mr. X" who contacted her with the potentially explosive documents in early October 2002—just as
Congress was debating whether to authorize President Bush to wage war against Iraq. The documents, consisting of telexes, letters and contracts, purported to show that Iraq had negotiated an agreement to purchase 500 tons of “yellowcake uranium from Niger, material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. (A U.S. intelligence official told NEWSWEEK that Martino is in fact believed to have been the distributor of the documents.)

Burba—under instructions from her editor at Panorama, a newsmagazine owned by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi—then provided the documents to the U.S. Embassy in Rome in an effort to authenticate them. The embassy soon passed the material on to Washington where some Bush administration officials viewed it as hard evidence to support its case that Saddam Hussein’s regime was actively engaged in a program to assemble nuclear weapons.

But the Niger component of the White House case for war quickly imploded. Asked for evidence to support President Bush’s contention in his State of the Union speech that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa, the administration turned over the Niger documents to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Within two hours, using the Google search engine, IAEA officials in Vienna determined the documents to be a crude forgery. At the urging of Sen. Jay Rockefeller, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the FBI launched an investigation into the Niger documents in an effort to determine if the United States government had been duped by a deliberate “disinformation” campaign organized by a foreign intelligence agency or others with a political agenda relating to Iraq.

So far, the bureau appears to have made little progress in unraveling the case. “The senator is frustrated by the slow pace of the investigation,” said Wendy Morigi, the press secretary for Senator Rockefeller, who was recently briefed on the status of the FBI probe.

One striking aspect of the FBI’s investigation is that, at least as of this week, Martino has told associates he has never even been interviewed by the bureau—despite the fact that he was publicly identified by the Financial Times of London as the source of the documents more than six weeks ago and was subsequently flown to New York City by CBS to be interviewed for the “60 Minutes” report.

A U.S. law-enforcement official said the FBI is seeking to interview Martino, but has not yet received permission to do so from the Italian government. The official declined to comment on other aspects of the investigation.

The case has taken on additional intrigue because of mounting
indications that Martino has longstanding relationships with European intelligence agencies. Martino recently told the Sunday Times of London that he had previously worked for SISMI, the Italian military-intelligence agency, a potentially noteworthy part of his resume given that the conservative Italian government of Berlusconi was a strong supporter of the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. A French government official told NEWSWEEK that Martino also had a relationship with French intelligence agencies. But the French official rejected suggestions from U.S. and British officials that French intelligence may have played a role in creating the documents in order to embarrass Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The French never disseminated the documents because they could not establish their authenticity, the French official said.

Martino has told Burba and others that he obtained the phony documents from an Italian woman who worked in the Niger Embassy in Rome. He was in turn put in touch with the woman by yet another middleman who, according to Burba’s account, had directed Martino to provide the documents to “the Egyptians.” Some press reports have suggested the still unidentified middleman who put Martino in touch with his Niger Embassy source was in fact a SISMI officer himself.

Burba, who has twice been interviewed by the FBI but never gave up Martino’s name, said she had been cooperating with the CBS team on the story in hopes of getting to the bottom of the matter. But now, with the “60 Minutes” broadcast postponed, she is no longer confident that can ever happen. Meanwhile, she said she is fed up with Martino who has “lied” to her and provided contradictory accounts to other journalists.

“T’m disappointed,” she told NEWSWEEK. “In this story, you don’t know who’s lying and who’s telling the truth. The sources have been both discredited and discredited themselves.”

Barbie Nadeau contributed to this report from Rome.

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Newsweek National News Section Front

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- Right Marries Talk Radio, Web
- Alter: How to Beat 'Cut and Run'
- Will Miami Terror Case Stick?
- Politics: Black-Latino Tensions Rise
- Live Talk: Hosenball on Terror Suspects
- Newsweek National News Section Front

Newsweek TOP STORIES

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- Iraq shrine bombing suspect held
- Immigration, Iraq drive '06 races

- Kuwait: Women Get First National Vote
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A Spy Speaks Out
Former Top CIA Official On "Faulty" Intelligence Claims

(Page 1 of 3) April 23, 2006

Quote

"The policy was set. The war in Iraq was coming and they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy."

Tyler Drumheller

(CBS) When no weapons of mass destruction surfaced in Iraq, President Bush insisted that all those WMD claims before the war were the result of faulty intelligence. But a former top CIA official, Tyler Drumheller — a 26-year veteran of the agency — has decided to do something CIA officials at his level almost never do: Speak out.

He tells correspondent Ed Bradley the real failure was not in the intelligence community but in the White House. He says he saw how the Bush administration, time and again, welcomed intelligence that fit the president's determination to go to war and turned a blind eye to intelligence that did not.
opinion that there was something questionable about it," he says.

Asked if that was his reaction, Drumheller says, "That was our reaction from the very beginning. The report didn't hold together."

Drumheller says that was the "general feeling" in the agency at that time.

However, Vice President Dick Cheney thought the story was worth investigating, and asked the CIA not to discount the story without first taking a closer look. So, in February 2002, the agency sent former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to investigate.

"If Saddam Hussein had acquired 500 tons of yellowcake uranium in violation of U.N. sanctions, that would be pretty serious, wouldn't it?" Bradley asked Wilson.

"Absolutely. Certainly. And the fact that there was an allegation out there that he was even attempting to purchase 500 tons of uranium was very serious, because it essentially meant that they were restarting their nuclear programs," Wilson replied.

Wilson spent eight days in Niger looking for signs of a secret deal to send yellowcake to Iraq. He spoke to government officials who would have known about such a transaction. No one did. There had been a meeting between Iraqis and Nigerians in 1999, but Wilson was told uranium had never been discussed. He also found no evidence that Iraq had even been interested in buying uranium.

"I concluded that it could not have happened," Wilson says. At the end of his eight-day stay in Niger, Wilson says he had no lingering doubts.

When he returned, Wilson told the CIA what he had learned. Despite that, some intelligence analysts stood by the Italian report that Saddam Hussein had purchased uranium from Niger. But the director of the CIA and the deputy director didn't buy it. In October, when the president’s speechwriters tried to put the Niger uranium story in a speech that President Bush was scheduled to deliver in Cincinnati, they intervened.

In a phone call and two faxes to the White House, they warned "the Africa story is overblown" and "the evidence is weak." The speechwriters took the uranium reference out of the speech.
Meanwhile, the CIA had made a major intelligence breakthrough on Iraq’s nuclear program. Naji Sabri, Iraq’s foreign minister, had made a deal to reveal Iraq’s military secrets to the CIA. Drumheller was in charge of the operation.

"This was a very high inner circle of Saddam Hussein. Someone who would know what he was talking about," Drumheller says.

"You knew you could trust this guy?" Bradley asked.

"We continued to validate him the whole way through," Drumheller replied.

According to Drumheller, CIA Director George Tenet delivered the news about the Iraqi foreign minister at a high-level meeting at the White House, including the president, the vice president and Secretary of State Rice.

At that meeting, Drumheller says, "They were enthusiastic because they said, they were excited that we had a high-level penetration of Iraqis."

What did this high-level source tell him?

"He told us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction program," says Drumheller.

"So in the fall of 2002, before going to war, we had it on good authority from a source within Saddam's inner circle that he didn't have an active program for weapons of mass destruction?" Bradley asked.

"Yes," Drumheller replied. He says there was doubt in his mind at all.

"It directly contradicts, though, what the president and his staff were telling us," Bradley remarked.

"The policy was set," Drumheller says. "The war in Iraq was coming. And they were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy."
But he says he was taken aback by what happened. "The group that was dealing with preparation for the Iraq war came back and said they're no longer interested," Drumheller recalls. "And we said, 'Well, what about the intel?' And they said, 'Well, this isn't about intel anymore. This is about regime change.'"

"And if I understand you correctly, when the White House learned that you had this source from the inner circle of Saddam Hussein, they were thrilled with that," Bradley asked.

"The first we heard, they were. Yes," Drumheller replied.

Once they learned what it was the source had to say — that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to wage nuclear war or have an active WMD program, Drumheller says, "They stopped being interested in the intelligence."

The White House declined to respond to Drumheller's account of Naji Sabri's role, but Secretary of State Rice has said that Sabri, the Iraqi foreign minister turned U.S. spy, was just one source, and therefore his information wasn't reliable.

"They certainly took information that came from single sources on uranium, on the yellowcake story and on several other stories with no corroboration at all and so you can't say you only listen to one source, because on many issues they only listened to one source," says Drumheller.

"So you're saying that if there was a single source and that information from that source backed up the case they were trying to build, then that single source was ok, but if it didn't, then the single source was not ok, because he couldn't be corroborated," Bradley asked.

"Unfortunately, that's what it looks like," Drumheller replied.

"One panel after another found that agencies were giving conflicting information to the president," Bradley remarked.

Drumheller admits they were. "And that's the problem. No. There was no one voice in coming out of the intelligence community and that allowed those people to pick and choose those bits of information that fit what they wanted to know."

A few weeks after Sabri told the CIA that Iraq had no active nuclear program, the Niger uranium story seemed to get a new life: Documents that supposedly could prove that Saddam had purchased uranium from Africa suddenly surfaced in Rome. The documents came from Rocco Martino, a former spy for Italian military intelligence.

For years, Martino operated in a shady intelligence underworld, buying government secrets and then selling them to the highest bidder. Martino told CBS News that a colonel minister.
in Italian military intelligence arranged for him to buy classified documents from a woman who worked in the embassy of Niger. One set of documents showed Iraq had purchased uranium from Niger.

What did he think when he first looked at the documents?

"I thought I had my hands on some important papers. And this same woman was telling me that they were very important," says Martino.

Continued

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(CBS)
In October 2002, Martino tried to sell the documents to Elisabeta Burba, a reporter for an Italian news magazine. She had purchased information from him in the past.

"When you saw the documents, what did you think?" Bradley asked Burba.

"I was puzzled because actually, if those documents were authentic, they would have been the 'smoking gun' that everybody was looking for in that moment," she replied.
When the documents arrived in Washington, State Department analysts quickly concluded they were suspect. One analyst wrote in an e-mail: "you’ll note that it bears a funky Emb. of Niger stamp (to make it look official, I guess)."

The Washington Post recently reported that in early January 2003, the National Intelligence Council, which oversees all U.S. intelligence agencies, did a final assessment of the uranium rumor and submitted a report to the White House. Their conclusion: The story was baseless. That might have been the end of the Niger uranium story.

But it wasn’t. Just weeks later, the president laid out his reasons for going to war in the State of the Union Address — and there it was again.

"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa," the president said.

"I didn’t even remember all the details of it because it was such a low-level, unimportant thing. But once it was in that State of the Union address, it became huge," says Drumheller.

"So, let me see if I have it correctly. The United States gets a report that Saddam is trying to buy uranium from Africa. But you and many others in our intelligence community quickly knock it down. And then the uranium story is removed from the speech that the President is to give in Cincinnati. Because the head of the CIA, George Tenet, doesn't believe in it?" Bradley asked.

"Right," Drumheller appeared.

It then appeared in the State of the Union address as a British report. Drumheller, who oversaw intelligence operations for the CIA in Europe doubts the British had something the U.S. didn't. "No. I don’t think they did," he says.

The British maintain they have intelligence to support the story — but to this day, they have never shared it.

The White House declined 60 Minutes’ request for an interview for this story, but Dan Bartlett, Counselor to the President, wrote us:

"The President’s convictions about Saddam Hussein's possession of WMD were based on the collective judgment of the intelligence community at that time. Bipartisan investigations … found no evidence of political pressure to influence the pre-war intelligence assessments of Iraq’s weapons programs." And he added: "Saddam Hussein never abandoned his plan to acquire WMD, and he posed a serious threat to the American people and to the region."

On March 7, 2003, the head of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency announced that the Niger uranium documents were forgeries. The Bush administration went to war in Iraq 12 days later, without acknowledging that one of its main arguments for going to war
was false.

Four months later, Wilson, who had gone to Niger and found nothing to substantiate the uranium rumor, went public and wrote a piece for The New York Times claiming that the Bush Administration had "twisted" the intelligence on Iraq:

"This was really an attempt to get the government to acknowledge that the 16 words should never have been in the State of the Union Address. It was as simple as that. If you are going to mislead the American people and you're caught at it, you ought to fess up to it," says Wilson.

One day after Wilson's piece appeared, the White House acknowledged the president should not have used the uranium claim. But according to newly released court records, the vice president's chief of staff, Scooter Libby, leaked classified intelligence to reporters a day later in an effort to bolster the uranium story. What Scooter Libby didn't tell reporters is that the White House had been warned before the State of the Union speech not to use the Niger uranium claim.

"At the same time they were admitting the words should not have been in the State of the Union address, they were, we now know, sending Libby out to selectively leak only those pieces that continued to support this allegation that was baseless. In other words, they were furthering the disinformation campaign," says Wilson.

"The American people want to believe the president. I have relatives who I've tried to talk to about this who say, 'Well, no, you can't tell me the president had this information and just ignored it,'" says Drumheller. "But I think over time, people will look back on this and see this is going to be one of the great, I think, policy mistakes of all time."
How Bogus Letter Became a Case for War

Intelligence Failures Surrounded Inquiry on Iraq-Niger Uranium Claim

By Peter Eisner
Washington Post Staff Writer

It was 3 a.m. in Italy on Jan. 29, 2003, when President Bush in Washington began reading his State of the Union address that included the now famous — later retracted — 16 words: "The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

Like most Europeans, Elisabetta Burba, an investigative reporter for the Italian newsweekly Panorama, waited until the next day to read the newspaper accounts of Bush’s remarks. But when she came to the 16 words, she recalled, she got a sudden sinking feeling in her stomach. She wondered: How could the American president have mentioned a uranium sale from Africa?

Burba felt uneasy because more than three months earlier, she had turned over to the U.S. Embassy in Rome documents about an alleged uranium sale by the central African nation of Niger. And she knew now that the documents were fraudulent and the 16 words wrong.

Nonetheless, the uranium claim would become a crucial justification for the invasion of Iraq that began less than two months later. When occupying troops found no nuclear program, the 16 words and how they came to be in the speech became a focus for critics in Washington and foreign capitals to press the case that the White House manipulated facts to take the United States to war.

Dozens of interviews with current and former intelligence officials and policymakers in the United States, Britain, France and Italy show that the Bush administration disregarded key information in its preparations for war.

See LETTER, A16, Col. 1
How a Bogus Document Became Key Point in the Case for Iraq War

**LETTER, From A1**

The ambassador’s representative arrived at 16:00, and introduced himself to the embassy press department came down to meet her. After a few formalities, an Italian letter introduced her to Jan Kelly, the embassy press spokesman.Kelly and Barbara walked across the embassy’s walled grounds and set down a cup of coffee in the garden. Barbara told Kelly that she had some documents about Iraq and uranium shipments and needed help in confirming their authenticity and accuracy.

Kelly interrupted her, realizing he needed help. He made a phone call summoning someone else from his staff as well as a political officer. Barbara recalled a third person being invited, possibly a U.S. military attaché. She didn’t get their names.

"Let’s go to my office," Kelly said. They walked past antiquities, a tranquil fountain, steps and pieces of wall set in a tree-lined garden.

The Italian journalist’s chat with Kelly and his colleagues was brief. She handed over the papers; Kelly told her the embassy would look into the matter. But Kelly had not been briefed on what others in the embassy knew.

**CIA Role**

One person who refused to meet with Kelly was the CIA chief of station. A few days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, Siomi, the Italian intelligence agency, had sent along information about the alleged sale of uranium to Iraq. The station chief arrived for more information and would later consider it far-fetched.

On Oct. 15, 2001, the CIA reascussed the information written a brief summary based on the Siomi intelligence, signed and dated it. and routed it to CIA’s Operations Directorate in Langley, with copies going to the clandestine service’s European and Near East divisions. The reports officer had limited its distribution because the intelligence was uncorroborated; she was aware of Siomi’s questionable track.

**About This Story**

This article was adapted from the book "The Italian Letter: How the Bush Administration Used a False Letter to Build the Case for War in Iraq," by Peter Elsner and Knut Royce, to be published today by Rodale Press.

ments were phony, and had produced by far the most accurate assessment of Iraq’s weapons program of the 16 agencies that make up the intelligence community. But the department’s small intelligence unit set out operating as if it were the new administration officials — not even Secretary of State Colin L. Powell had paid much attention to its analytical product, much of which clashed with the White House’s assumptions.

The State Department bureaucracy, nevertheless, shared the bogus documents with those intelligence officials attending the meeting, including representatives of the Energy Department, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. Four CIA officials attended, but only one, a clandestine service officer, bothered to take a copy of the Italian letter.

He returned to his office, filled the mailbox in a safe and forgot about it.

The Niger uranium matter was not uppermost in the minds of the CIA analysts. Some of them had to deal with the issue in any case, largely because Cheney’s side office, bothered to take a copy of the Italian letter.

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Burba arrived in Niamey, Niger’s capital, on Oct. 17 and began tracking down leads on the Italian letter. She did find that the uranium came from a bubble. Few analysts say most likely it was rogue officials selling it.

Burba returned to Milan and reported her findings to her bosses in detail. She did find that the uranium came from a bubble. Few analysts say most likely it was rogue officials selling it.

The Bush administration had also released information about the forged documents from Italian intelligence, which it wished she could have come earlier to reveal the fraud.

Burba knew that the Bush administration had also released information about the forged documents from Italian intelligence, which it wished she could have come earlier to reveal the fraud.

It remains unclear who fabricated the documents. Intelligence officials say most likely it was rogue elements in Siomi who wanted to make money selling them.

**The Italian Letter**

Oct. 15: Italian intelligence agency Siomi gives CIA Rome station the first report about the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal. CIA Rome station reports to Washington, noting that the information is uncorroborated.

Feb. 12: The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports that Niger is supplying 500 tons of uranium a year to Iraq.

Feb. 14: CIA reports on the Italian letter is based on "crucial details."

Feb. 26: Ambassador Joseph Wilson flies to Niger for the CIA and reports a week later that there is no evidence of the sale.

Oct. 1: The Intelligence Community publishes a National Intelligence Estimate that says there has been no evidence among the weapons program and rejects the claim that Iraq has been shopping for uranium.

Rocco Martino Elisabetta Burba

The Italian letter, written in French, that turned out to have been forged.

Jan. 28: President Bush delivers State of the Union address, including the "16 words" about the uranium deal.


**The Washington Post**

**WORLD NEWS**

**THE WASHINGTON POST**
"Do you remember me?" the deep voice said, without identifying himself outright. It was Rocco Martino, an old source who had proved reliable in the past. He was once again trying to sell her information.

Martino said he had some very interesting documents to show her, and asked whether she could fly down to Rome right away. They met at a restaurant in Rome on Oct. 7, where Martino showed Burba a folder filled with documents, most of them in French. One of the documents was purportedly sent by the president of Niger to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, confirming a deal to sell 500 tons of uranium to Iraq annually. This was the smoking gun in the package, claiming to show the formal approval of Niger’s president to supply Iraq with a commodity that would in all likelihood only be used for a nuclear weapons program. Iraq had no nuclear power plants.

Though the document was in French it would later come to be known as "The Italian Letter." It was written in all capital letters, in the form of an old telex, and bore the letterhead of the Republic of Niger. The letter was dated July 27, 2000, and included an odd seal on the top, a shining sun surrounded by a horned animal head, a star and a bird. The letter was stamped Confidential and Urgent.

The letter said that "500 tons of pure uranium per year will be delivered in two phases." A seal at the bottom of the page read "The Office of the President of the Republic of Niger." Superimposed over the seal was a barely legible signature bearing the name of the president of Niger, Mamadou Tandja.

Burba listened without saying much as she took a first look at the documents. She recognized right away that the material was hot, if authentic. But confirming the origin would be difficult, she recalled thinking at the time. She didn’t want to fall into a trap.

Burba and Martino made an agreement; she would take the documents, and if they checked out as authentic, then they could talk about money.

‘Let’s Go to the Americans’

Back in her magazine’s Milan newsroom, Burba told her editors she thought it would make sense to fly to Niger and check around for confirmation. The editor of the magazine, Carlo Rosella, agreed. He then suggested they simultaneously pursue another tack.

‘Let’s go to the Americans,’ Rosella said, "because they are focused on looking for weapons of mass destruction more than anyone else.

‘Let’s see if they can authenticate the documents.’ Rosella called the U.S. Embassy in Rome and alerted officials to expect a visit from Burba.

On Wednesday morning, Oct. 9, Burba returned to Rome and took a cab to the U.S. Embassy, which is housed at the old Palazzo Margherita.

Burba came to a security gate and walked through a magnetometer, where an Italian employee of the intelligence was uncorroborated; she was aware of Slami’s questionable track record and did not believe the report merited wider dissemination.

The Operations Directorate then passed the raw intelligence to the CIA’s Intelligence Directorate and to sister agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency. A more polished document, called a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, was written at Langley three days later in which the CIA mentioned the new intelligence but added important caveats. The classified document, whose distribution was limited to senior policymakers and the congressional intelligence committees, said there was no corroborating evidence and noted that Iraq had "no known facilities for processing or enriching the material."

Pushing the Africa Claim

Almost four months later, on Feb. 5, 2002, the CIA received more information from Slami, including the verbart text of one of the documents. The CIA failed to recognize that it was riddled with errors, including misspellings and the wrong names for key officials. But it was a separate DIA report about the same claims that would lead Cheney to demand further investigation. In response, the CIA dispatched Wilson to Niger.

Martino’s approach to Burba eight months later with the Italian letter coincided with accelerating U.S. preparations for war. On Oct. 7, 2002, the same day Martino gave Burba the dossier, President Bush launched a new hardline PR campaign on Iraq. In a speech in Cincinnati, he declared that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was a "grave threat" to U.S. national security.

"It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons," the president warned.

CIA Director George J. Tenet had vetted the text of Bush’s speech and was able to persuade the White House to drop one questionable claim that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa. The information was too fishy, Tenet explained to the National Security Council and Bush’s speechwriters.

Bush dropped the shopping-for-uranium claim, but ratcheted up the bomb threat. He said in Cincinnati that if Hussein obtained bomb-grade uranium the size of a softball, he would have a nuclear bomb within a year. This particular doomsday scenario had first been unveiled several weeks earlier, on Aug. 25, by Cheney. In a speech in Nashville to the 103rd national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, he declared with no equivocation that Hussein had "resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons."

On Oct. 16, Burba sat on a plane on her way to Niger, while in Washington, copies of the Italian letter and the accompanying dossier were placed on the table at an interagency nuclear proliferation meeting hosted by the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

At this point, State Department analysts had determined the docu-
PER our discussion this morning, we at HQ have briefed this up the COC and you will have the support and concurrence from FBI HQ in furtherance of the following three items:

1. An investigative update for (though limited due to only one interview conducted since last briefing)

2. Commitment to closure at the completion of

Thanks.

--- Original Message ----
From: (CD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 8:46 AM
To: (WF) (FBI); (CD) (FBI); DESLAURIERS, RICHARD (CD) (FBI)
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Update

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

Need to get this ball rolling ASAP.

--- Original Message ----
From: (RO) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 6:34 AM
To: (WF) (FBI)
Cc: 
Subject: RE: Update

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD
After these two o/s leads, we should have enough to shut the case down as we have then addressed all pertinent investigative avenues. I will be in touch when we begin to think about If you think we should proceed with this request now,

Regards,

UC Room 4133

What’s the status on Iraq/Niger.

LT
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE
Date: 04/17/2007

To: Counterintelligence
Attn: A/UC Room 4133
Attn: IA/0S Room 4133

From: Washington Field
Contact: SA

Approved By:

Drafted By: dmh

Case ID #: (S) (Pending)

Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
U.S. GOVERNMENT RE IRAQI EFFORTS
TO OBTAIN URANIUM FROM NIGER;
FCI-PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT (X)

Synopsis: Closes captioned case and requests concurrence
for closing captioned case from

(S) Derived From: G-3
Declassify On: X1

Details: Captioned investigation was predicated on a
03/14/2003 letter from U.S. Senator John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  04/17/2007

Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to FBI Director Mueller. Below is the text of that letter:

"Dear Director Mueller:

As you know, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has recently determined that some of the intelligence documents provided to it by the United States are forgeries. These documents were provided to the IAEA as evidence of Iraqi efforts to procure uranium from the Republic of Niger. I am writing to request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigate this matter.

While U.S. concerns regarding alleged Iraqi nuclear weapons development programs have not been based primarily on these forgeries, there is a possibility that the fabrication of these documents may be part of a larger deception campaign aimed at manipulating public opinion and foreign policy regarding Iraq. Hence, I believe it is important to ascertain the following: the source of the documents; the level of sophistication of the forgeries; the motivation of those responsible for the forgeries; why the Intelligence Community did not recognize the documents were fabricated; and the extent to which these forgeries may be part of a larger disinformation campaign.

A thorough investigation should, at a minimum, help to allay any concerns that the U.S. Intelligence Community, or other elements of the U.S. Government, were involved in the creation of these documents in order to build support for the Administration's policies. I hope to hear from you as expeditiously as possible. I greatly appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,
John D. Rockefeller, IV
Vice Chairman"
To: Counterintelligence
From: Washington Field
Re: (S) 04/17/2007

(S) At the direction of FBIHQ/Counterintelligence Division, WFO initiated the captioned Legat London, Legat Paris, Legat Rome, and Legat Vienna.

(U) In March 2005, after 21 months of investigation, all of the questions/points raised in Senator Rockefeller's letter were answered as follows:
To: Counterintelligence
From: Washington Field
Re: (S) 04/17/2007

Motivation of those responsible for the forgeries:

Why the Intelligence Community did not recognize the documents were fabricated: Once the USIC finally received the documents (after provided them to the U.S. Embassy on 10/09/2002), the documents were considered suspect at best, and likely forgeries.

The extent to which these forgeries may be part of a larger disinformation campaign:

While there have been numerous conspiracy theories promoted in the media, the bottom line is that the first FBI investigation (from 06/16/2003 to 04/01/2005) answered all of the questions/issues posed by Senator Rockefeller’s letter—the documents were not created as part of a perception management campaign to influence public opinion and foreign policy regarding the invasion of Iraq. In reading the letter,

Since the first investigation conducted from 06/16/2003 to 04/01/2005 answered the Senator’s questions as stated in his letter, and WFO believed no purpose was served by continuing with the investigation, the case was closed on 04/01/2005.

On 11/10/2005 the captioned case was re-opened because of a FREIHO request for WFO to re-open the investigation.
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S) 04/17/2007

WFO, with liaison assistance from Legat Rome, was requested to set a lead to Legat Rome on 11/08/2005 to cover Request #1 and #2 (serial). Due to numerous circumstances, multiple requests and attempts to interview were denied by [REDACTED].
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  04/17/2007

(S) Since the first investigation answered all of the questions posed by Senator Rockefeller and the second investigation on the captioned case yielded no compelling evidence to substantiate a perception management campaign against the U.S.

WFO is closing the case as there are no further feasible leads to follow in furtherance of the captioned case.
To: Counterintelligence  From: Washington Field
Re: (S)  , 04/17/2007

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Action)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

AT WASHINGTON, DC

(S) is requested to grant concurrence to close captioned case and to notify WFO of concurrence via EC.

++
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE  Date: 12/07/2007

To:  Washington Field
From: Washington Field

Contact: SA

Approved By:  
Drafted By:  

Case ID #: (S) (Closed)

Title:  UNSUB(S); FALSE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO US GOVERNMENT

Synopsis:  Close captioned case and all related subfiles.

Details:  The captioned case and all related subfiles should be closed, as all investigative leads have been exhausted.

Case Background

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG F54M93K42
REASON: 1.4 (B,C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2032
DATE: 01-20-2016
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ASSIGNED TO
SA
SQUAD
DATE  2/07
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A thorough investigation should, at a minimum, help to allay any concerns that the U.S. Intelligence Community, or other elements of the U.S. Government, were involved in the creation of these documents in order to build support for the Administration's policies. I hope to hear from you as expeditiously as possible. I greatly appreciate your assistance in this matter.

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To: Washington Field
From: Washington Field

Re: 12/07/2007

On 11/10/2005 the captioned case was re-opened because of a FBIHQ request for WFO to re-open the investigation to address outstanding investigative leads. The issues to be addressed are included in the following three (3) paragraphs:

WFO, with liaison assistance from Legat Rome, was requested to cover Request #1 and #2 (serial). Due to numerous circumstances, WFO set a lead to Legat Rome on 11/08/2005 to...
Multiple requests and attempts to interview were denied by [redacted].

Since the first investigation answered all of the questions posed by Senator Rockefeller and the second investigation on the captioned case yielded no compelling evidence to substantiate a perception management campaign against the U.S. and [redacted], WFO has closed the case as there are no further feasible leads to follow in furtherance of the captioned case.