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Book Excerpt: Chapter 1
Deadly Dogma coverDeadly Dogma #1
Strike "First

by Grant F. Smith

It is official military policy that the United States of America will deter challenges from rivals through limitless spending and military preemption.  This relatively new and radical doctrine is the result of thirty years of behind-the-scenes neoconservative machinations.  Preemption provides unlimited opportunities for neocon power-brokering of military spending (discussed in chapter 2), permanent political positioning on the “high” strategic rhetorical ground of “defending America,” and opportunities to direct and channel American military might against Israeli rivals (discussed in chapter 5).

Preemption hasn't always been embedded in US military strategy.  Its inclusion is the culmination of years of efforts by Paul Wolfowitz and a constellation of other neoconservative thinkers and cheerleaders to integrate the first-strike mentality into formal American defense strategy.

All the major spending elements of the preemptive national security strategy, including regime change in Iraq, “more usable” nuclear arms, denial of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and deployment of exorbitantly expensive “Star Wars” missile intercept systems, were crafted and promoted by neoconservative think tanks such as the Project for the New American Century, the American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Security Policy, and the National Institute for Public Policy long before George W. Bush took office.

Wolfowitz and First Strike Theory

In 2002, former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz presented a new and fundamentally radical strategy for defending the United States.  His plan, titled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” is still the country's guiding strategic military document at the time of this writing.

A central strategy in the document is preemption, or striking at “gathering threats”:

“We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” National Security Strategy of the United States of America [i]

Wolfowitz began his road to preemption as a prot�g� of RAND nuclear-war-fighting theorist Albert Wohlstetter. Wolfowitz saw nuclear proliferation as the true global threat during his education at Chicago University.  In his dissertation, Wolfowitz wrote that nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be a matter of “gravest concern.” [ii] He later joined Richard Perle in the office of Washington State Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and entered a darker, less theoretical world where he moved massive amounts of taxpayer dollars through hype, illusion, and fear-driven defense contracts.

In 1974, Wolfowitz contrived to convince Congress that there was a military “spending gap” between the US and the Soviet Union, requiring the US to “catch up.”  His approach comparing US military spending as a percentage of GDP in steady state with Soviet spending rocketing off the top of the chart is eerily similar to a comparison by the Project for the New American Century (PNAC, a neocon think tank) two decades later in the report “Rebuilding America's Defenses.”  But this similarity to later neoconservative tactics did not end with comparative GDP charts.  The neoconservative strategy of manipulating and finessing intelligence to suit predetermined goals was first championed by Paul Wolfowitz.

Wolfowitz mentor Albert Wohlstetter and US Air Force Generals George Keegan and Daniel Graham attempted to gain access to raw CIA intelligence data covering Soviet military might and production. In a refrain that in many ways resembles pre-invasion claims about Iraq WMD, Wohlstetter and Wolfowitz claimed that the “CIA systematically underestimated the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile in its annual National Intelligence Estimates.”[iii]   They were quickly supported and promoted by a plethora of military contract-minded legislators in Congress demanding an alternative and objective independent “threat assessment” authored by unbiased “outside experts” unafraid of revealing true threats to America.

The CIA rejected the neocons' request for raw intelligence, but was overruled in 1976 when George H.W. Bush entered as CIA director and finally delivered raw intelligence to the outside group.   The subsequent reports that Wolfowitz and his teammates delivered were as fantastical as they were flawed.

They forecast that the Soviet Union would deploy about 500 nuclear-armed Backfire bombers by 1984.  In reality, Backfires did not number over 200 until 1996.[iv]  They also claimed that the Soviet Union was working on a new stealth submarine.  Just as neoconservatives argued that Iraqi WMDs must have been shipped to Syria because none could be found in Iraq, lack of evidence about the “stealth submarine” transmogrified into definitive proof of its existence and the need for countermeasures.  The neocons claimed that the absence of evidence meant the submarine was probably already deployed.[v]   The authors of the outside report imagined immense Soviet nuclear stockpiles far outnumbering the US arsenal and created what is now known to be a completely false picture of a Soviet Union armed to the teeth and capable of dominating the world.  In hindsight, most of their analysis was fanciful, contrived, and wholly inaccurate. 

There is another important parallel between the case of the missing Soviet juggernaut and the neocon case for invading Iraq.  When the neocons' Soviet juggernaut reports were entirely rejected and ignored by the incoming Carter administration, they didn't give up.  Rather, they took their battle to the press and mass media, ultimately calling for congressional hearings, even as the Soviet Union's economy continued to weaken and then teeter on the brink of collapse.

Decades later, members of the Project for the New American Century would also take their case for invading Iraq to the public by releasing an open letter to President Clinton on January 26, 1998.   (See Appendix A.)  The PNAC letter demanded that Clinton commit to regime change in Iraq in his upcoming State of the Union address, since absence of evidence meant Saddam Hussein was up to something: “Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished.”  The PNAC letter also frankly and openly referenced three core neoconservative concerns: troop logistics, Israel, and oil supplies.

“It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world's supply of oil will all be put at hazard.” PNAC letter to President Clinton, 11/26/1998[vi]

Paul Wolfowitz had attempted to incorporate a radical new doctrine of preemption into the US National Security Strategy as a Reagan-era DOD appointee, but failed.  Reviewers and policymakers alike believed that a core strategy based on first strikes against hazy threats was too blunt an instrument, would not always “fit the crimes” of the targeted nation, and relied too heavily on sketchy and unreliable intelligence to be practical.[vii]  However, many neoconservatives still believe that even if a first strike is unleashed against the wrong country, it can still have benefits, no matter what the expense or damage to America's reputation. 

“Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business.” Michael Ledeen, American Enterprise Institute [viii]

First-Strike Mythology and the 1967 Six-Day War

Neoconservatives' enduring infatuation with and mythology of military preemption is based on their understanding of the “success” of the 1967 Israeli first strike against the Egyptian Air Force.  The 1967 Israeli-Arab war is heralded in bestselling books such as Michael Oren's Six Days of War and continually cited in the print media and even on American radio talk shows as definitively proving that military preemption works.

“Thirty-five years ago, on June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and three of its Arab neighbors. In a mere six days, the Israelis captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank of the Jordan River from the Kingdom of Jordan. The Six Day War's outcome set the stage for all subsequent relations between Arabs and Israelis. In time for this anniversary a book has appeared that- drawing on interviews and archival research in Israel, Egypt, the United States and Russia - gives as complete an account of the 1967 war as is ever likely to be written. In addition to providing the definitive history of that conflict, Michael B. Oren's “Six Days of War” offers a valuable perspective on the current troubles in the region.” Council on Foreign Relations[ix]

The mythology of a small, susceptible Israel surrounded and attacked by superior and hostile foes is repeated endlessly in the US news media by pundits and supporters:

“…prior to 1967 Palestine was controlled by Great Britain, and the land was divided into Jordan and Israel, Jordan was designated as the land for the Palestinians, and all the land to the west of the Jordan River was Israel for the Jews. Let's not forget the only reason that Israel controls the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is because she was attacked by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and confiscated the lands as spoils of the war.” Radio host Armstrong Williams[x]

The concept that Israel is justified in keeping the territorial spoils of war as compensation for an unprovoked and unavoidable attack reaches up into the highest levels of the US Department of Defense. 

“My feeling about the so-called occupied territories are that there was a war, Israel urged neighboring countries not to get involved in it once it started, they all jumped in, and they lost a lost of real estate to Israel because Israel prevailed in that conflict. In the intervening period, they've made some settlements in various parts of the so-called occupied area, which was the result of a war, which they won.” Donald Rumsfeld, August 6, 2002[xi]

What Michael Oren's book about the 1967 war fails to mention, as do most other observers and writers, is that the Israeli attack didn't prevent an attack from Israel's enemies—on the contrary, it guaranteed a war that otherwise would never have occurred.   We now know this thanks to the release of previously classified Johnson administration documentation and diplomatic cables released from the US State Department Office of the Historian on January 12, 2004 (see Appendix B).  Few historians have updated their work to incorporate the stark diplomatic realities documented in the days leading up to war.

While Israel did attack Egyptian forces, it did so in full possession of intelligence that Egypt was attempting to wind down the crisis through shuttle diplomacy with Israel's largest foreign supporter, the United States. 

The buildup to the crisis began with Palestinian attacks on Israel from bases located in Syria.  This led to increasing Israeli insecurity, and missteps and blunders in the “fog of war” quickly escalated into a crisis.   Syria believed that Israel would invade, and looked to Egypt for support. Egypt responded by moving troops into the Sinai Peninsula and ordering the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces. Amid escalating threats from both Israeli and Arab sides, Jordan then signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt.

Israel launched a preemptive strike against the three Arab states on June 5, 1967, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank of the Jordan River, Old City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Neoconservative and Israeli lore embedded in most historical accounts hails this as an unavoidable and heroic response to imminent attack while discounting what was actually happening on the Arab and US diplomatic front.  Another typical history book about the war, Six Days in the Sun, makes this clear:

“It is of only academic interest now whether the Egyptian aircraft that the Israelis claim to have seen on their radar screens just before the attack was launched were really bent on aggressive moves against Israel, or whether they were the routine early morning patrols of whose timing the Israelis were fully aware from earlier intelligence missions.  The Israelis had no doubts about the war of destruction that the Arabs had planned for them.  They acted first—and left the questioning to the gentlemen at United Nations headquarters who had more time for such things and whose countries were not subject to daily threats of annihilation.” Six Days in the Sun[xii] 

Many testosterone-drenched chronicles of this conflict must now be rewritten.  Those previously classified US State Department documents released by the Office of the Historian on January 12, 2004[xiii] entirely refute the “heroic Israeli preemption in the face of long odds and inevitable attack.” narrative.   The previously classified chronology of secret Johnson administration communications reveals laborious Egyptian efforts to wind down the military escalation and vain US attempts to restrain the Israeli “tiger” from a first strike.  

“June 2, 1967, Egyptian President Nasser promised the US administration that he would not strike first, but was anxious about being overrun by Israel necessitating an Egyptian military mobilization into the Egypt's Sinai.   Nasser stated that he did not want repetition of 1956 when he was ‘reluctant to believe that an attack had begun and was slow in moving troops to Sinai only to be caught between the Israelis in the north and the British at Port Said.' He said he had no other choice but to mobilize and send troops to Sinai in a defensive posture, but critically, that he would not begin any fight but would wait until the Israelis had moved.”  Newly declassified Johnson administration papers[xiv]

Israel was then instructed by the US to wait and not to act rashly by attacking Egypt.

On June 3, 1967, while arranging a diplomatic visit with President Johnson, Nasser again guaranteed that Egyptian troops in the Sinai were defensive positions designed to deter an Israeli invasion.  Johnson apparently believed him.  On June 3, 1967, President Johnson issued a strong warning about territorial integrity to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol. 

“Our position in this crisis rests on two principles which are vital national interests of the United States. The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all of the countries of the Middle East. This principle has now been affirmed by four American Presidents.  I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.” Newly declassified Johnson administration papers [xv]

The US circulated a secret memorandum to US embassies in Arab states on June 3, 1967 expressing frustration over the level of control the US could actually expect to exert over Israel.

“You should not assume that the United States can order Israel not to fight for what it considers to be its most vital interests. We have used the utmost restraint and, thus far, have been able to hold Israel back. But the ‘Holy War' psychology of the Arab world is matched by an ‘apocalyptic psychology' within Israel.” Newly declassified Johnson administration papers [xvi]

On June 4, 1967, Secretary Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Council Special Representative Walt Rostow, and Ambassador Thompson began preparations for the visit of Egyptian Vice President Mohieddin and discussed ways to “hold the Israeli ‘tiger'“.   The secretary of state informed the Israeli ambassador of Mohieddin's visit.

The Israeli cabinet discussed Mohieddin's visit and the likely fallout if Mohieddin's peace mission became public knowledge.[xvii]   The June 6, 1967 Israeli first strike effectively thwarted the exhaustive US diplomatic efforts and the inevitable gradual demobilization of Arab military forces.  Israel's first strike created immense territorial issues and hard feelings that endure to the present day, including Israel's occupation of Old Jerusalem and large portions of the West Bank.  Israel's ongoing brutal occupation of these Palestinian lands is also a documented generator of suicide terrorism in retaliation against Israel and the US.[xviii]

The damage done to US interests is that by later enshrining and embedding that mythologized “first strike” into the US national security strategy, neocons have forced Americans to embrace the idea that first strikes work.  1967 is proof that first strikes rapidly and irreversibly sweep diplomatic options off the table. Although first strikes are easily supported by deceptions of the day that can take decades to debunk, first strikes limit diplomacy in crisis by reducing the amount of time available for effective negotiations.

Worse, first-strike strategies increase the likelihood that disingenuous intelligence, manipulation, and faulty analysis will be injected into the decision process by partisans of war.   Wolfowitzian “stealth submarines” and other disinformation can suddenly loom large in the decision process.  Unverifiable threats in the heady environment preceding a first strike suddenly become real.  The 1967 Israeli first strike, when viewed from the perspective of the newly released material, helps us better understand the hasty manipulations stoking the US invasion of Iraq.  Reality in both cases shows a confident aggressor, sure of achieving advantage for striking first, conducting empty diplomacy while assuring its population that war would be a last resort.

Israel was able to conflate a flare-up in its conflict with the PLO to seize strategic and “holy” territory it had long coveted, and do so in a manner that not only guaranteed military success but created a strong bid for internationally legitimate annexation.   To date, only the Bush administration, spurred by Israel's politically active lobbies in the US, has hinted at legitimizing the Israeli annexations.

“In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.”   George W. Bush,  1/14/2004 [xix] 

Before the first strike, Israeli intelligence analysts and government officials funneled a constant stream of disinformation to the Johnson administration that grossly inflated the military superiority of its Arab neighbors in order to secure more military funding and equipment from the United States.  CIA analysts debunked Israel's analysis and relayed corrected information to the Johnson administration, which allowed it to dismiss and ignore false Israeli claims.[xx] 

In the long term, the disinformation campaign accompanying the war would color history.  Israel seized the moment to launch the war in a way that allowed it to market its land captures within the “embattled valiant nation fighting for survival in the face of long odds” framework that endures to this day.  The Johnson administration was not politically able to restrain Israel, implement US policy, or explain its true reservations about Israeli aggression to the American public.  Israel then mined audiences persuaded by the embattled-nation mythology for additional charitable donations, political support for military aid that the false Israeli intelligence could not secure from Johnson, and propagation of an attractive strategic myth about the glories of military preemption that endures in books and policy circles.

The Hidden Benefits of First-Strike Doctrine

In the US, neocon enshrinement of these 1967 mythologies does more than pull the American six-shooter out of its holster:  the preemption doctrine installs a hair-trigger on the entire US military.  This increases the probability that the US will fire on the wrong enemy without due consideration and deliberation. 

Most Americans would consider the US invasion of Iraq, executed on the false pretext of disarming a hostile country stockpiled with weapons of mass destruction, to be a case against preemption. In the twisted logic of neoconservative luminaries, even the monumental folly of striking Iraq on false pretexts is evidence of the need to shave down the hair-trigger further.  Richard Perle, a key architect of the war in Iraq, explained the perils of waiting to a journalist as follows:

“If you want to try to wait until the very last minute, you'd better be very confident of your intelligence because if you're not, you won't know when the last minute is.  And so, ironically, one of the lessons of the inadequate intelligence of Iraq is you'd better be careful how long you choose to wait. I can't tell you when we may face a similar choice with Iran. But it's either take action now or lose the option of taking action.” Richard Perle, 2/4/2006 [xxi]

Taking options off the table and “throwing a country against the wall” by mistake are certainly in line with neoconservative sloganeering and punditry.  However, they are inimical to a nation founded on the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that holds itself out as an example to the world.    Adopting such cynical and deception-prone policies would re-shackle the American people to the monarchial tyranny of following unelected despots who are endlessly plotting wars of aggression for their own and others' purposes and selling them to America as the “defense of the nation.”

Justifying a military action as a “first strike” or “preemption” is more difficult if it is later revealed that the supposed opponent, such as Egypt, was suing for peace.   Therefore, there is a movement underway to maintain the mythologies present in pre-2004 texts about the Six-Day War.  Relatively few have been updated to encompass the Johnson administration data.  Editing battles rage at popular online encyclopedias such as Wikipedia, with updated entries reflecting the newly declassified data being erased by censors enamored of a simpler, earlier history. 

This is because history matters.  If it becomes the popular belief that Egypt—or Iraq—had no offensive intentions or capabilities, maintaining a preemption policy is more difficult.  In these cases, the term “first strike” and “preemption” should be retired for more accurate terminology.  If an opponent had no intention or capability of striking, the word “first” simply does not apply.  However, neoconservatives continue to ardently defend both events as preemptive wars.  Why?  Because preemption has benefits…for neoconservatives.

Preemption has moved the lever of power away from a larger group of people monitoring quantitative and objective metrics, such as enemy troop movements, weapons deployment, or verifiable conspiracies, into the hands of a few dealing in the realm of the subjective.  Even in the Reagan era, nuclear disarmament was governed by the doctrine of “trust, but verify.”

Under the neoconservative dogma of preemption, the first strike is a decision to be made by well-placed neoconservatives, on a “trust me to verify” basis.  America can now go to war based on only the advice of neoconservatives.  The US will attack Iran if neoconservatives determine that the “time has come” and it has become a “threat to America.”  No quantitative measure of estimated WMD development capability, launchers, or intentions will be needed.  The strike could come tomorrow simply because, as Richard Perle would say, “it's either take action now or lose the option of taking action.”

Gradually, analysts and historians may begin to describe the US action in Iraq simply as the “invasion and occupation.”   However, an entire corpus of reliable documents and frank perspectives contained in secret cables and communications may never be released. 

Over 55,000 public documents that were originally declassified and released in 1999 are now quietly being reclassified and, wherever possible, pulled from public view.  Some relate to the Korean War and the early Cold War and could be as revealing in terms of the evolution of strategy and doctrine as the Johnson administration documents on the Six-Day War.  Recently reclassified documents also include decades-old State Department reports.[xxii]  If this “national security state” mentality and acceleration toward broader classification continues, today's secrets about the deliberations preceding the Iraq invasion may continue to be secret indefinitely.

Given the irreversible release of classified documents from the US State Department on the Israeli attacks of 1967, however, at some point in the future, historians may refer to 1967 as an “Israeli war of aggression” while explaining the escalation and tense situation on the ground.   The costs of the occupation that follows military preemption with exposed ground forces, however, may ultimately attract more public attention that the original pretexts for war.

Occupying Ill-Gotten Territory

Invasions and occupations based on first-strike theory can be burdensome to the national treasury and international stature of the occupier.  In a move reminiscent of Israel's bid to annex territory captured in 1967, the Bush administration is quickly solidifying its hold on strategic ground in Iraq.  The United States is constructing six permanent military bases in Iraq, which will have to be financed indefinitely.  The US is suffering daily attacks on highways, pipelines, and refineries as insurgents attempt to dislodge the “foreign occupier.”  Israel's attempt to swallow the West Bank has been somewhat restrained by the lack of enough settlers to occupy the entire area and the difficulty of securing it against conventional and unconventional counterattack.

On the international front, Israel has been the object of UN resolutions, International Court of Justice rulings, and world condemnation for its occupation of Palestinian lands.  Israel may ultimately have to come to grips with the reality that most nations will never accept Israeli annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.  Press statements by the acting head of Israel's ruling Likud party have indicated a desire to hold on to strategic territory:

“Even though we're talking about a security fence, my instructions are that Gush Etzion and Maale Adumim remain an inseparable part of the State of Israel,” Ehud Ohlmert, acting Prime Minister, 2/7/2006 [xxiii] 

Like Israel, the United States is stuck with the financial burden of either defending occupied territory or retreating from it.  Territories conquered on deceptive preemptive pretexts compound the costs of lost credibility with the hard costs of occupation.


[i]  National Security Strategy, p. 15

[ii]Neocons: The Men behind the Curtain,” Khurram Husain.  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Chicago: Nov/Dec 2003.  Vol. 59, Iss. 6, pp. 62-71 

[iii] Ibid.

[iv] “Estimated Russian Stockpile, September 1996,” Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996, pp. 62-63

[v] Ibid.

[vi]  PNAC Open Letter to President Clinton, 11/26/1998

[vii] “War Behind Closed Doors,” Frontline, PBS,

[viii] “Baghdad Delenda Est, Part Two, Get On with It,” Jonah Goldberg, National Review, 4/23/2002

[ix] “A Hot War Led to a Cold Peace in the Mideast,” Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations Op-Ed, 6/25/2005

[x] “Mythologies of the Gaza Withdrawal and 1967 War,” WWRL-AM New York Drive Time Dialogue with Armstrong Williams and Sam Greenfield, 8/15/2005 Radio Interview Transcript

[xi] Excerpt from United States Department of Defense News Transcript

Comments by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, August 6, 2002

[xii]The Time Of The Burning Sun: Six Days of War, Twelve Weeks of Hope,” Michael Bernet, Chester and West, NY, 2004, p. 2

[xiii] Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967,

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Ibid.

[xvi] Ibid.

[xvii]“The 1967 War Revisited: New Sources and their Implications,” Speech, Charles Smith, University of Arizona Near Eastern Studies Professor, U.S. State Department, 1/12/2004, rtsp://

[xviii] “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Robert Pape, University of Chicago

[xix] “White House Transcript of Bush-Sharon press conference regarding Sharon's Gaza ‘Disengagement' plan,” April 14, 2004, “

[xx] “The 1967 War Revisited: New Sources and their Implications,” Speech, Charles Smith, University of Arizona Near Eastern Studies Professor, U.S. State Department, 1/12/2004, rtsp://

[xxi] “Iraq errors show West must act fast on Iran: Perle,” Reuters, Feb 4, 2006

[xxii] “US ‘reclassifying' public files,” BBC, 2/21/2006,

[xxiii] “Olmert: Maale Adumim part of Israel,” Ronny Sofer, Yedioth Ahronoth, 2/7/2006

Review Copy Reactions

"I had no idea so many neoconservatives had a history of direct or indirect involvement in espionage against the United States….a real eye opener!"

"This book's analytical comparison of the organizational structure of the Mafia and neoconservative political machine in the US is brilliant!  That chart alone is worth the cover price!"

"I think the cover graphic says it all:  if neoconservatives continue to launch hostile 'arrows' of the 'noble lie', Israeli 'interests' and first strike strategies against core American ideals, the eagle will fall."

"I had no idea how and why neoconservatives insinuate themselves into brokering massive US military contracts, and then use their power and influence to push around the US Congress.  But there it is, culled from Richard Perle's own writing to an Israeli Prime Minister: How to Corrupt the American Congress for a foreign power 101…"

"I hope this book gets a fair hearing at DOJ and makes its way into the hands of Grand Juries across America."

"The level of neoconservative contempt for international and domestic law is truly amazing."

"I was always uncomfortable about the US adopting a "First Strike" doctrine.  Now I know why!  The section on the Israeli first strike in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and how it guaranteed conflict that otherwise would not have occurred is a real shocker…"

"I always thought extortion was a crime against a business.  I see now that in the military-industrial-neocon sense, it is really a crime against US taxpayers…"

"I think this book is a frank and illuminating about the function of militant Zionism in neoconservative thought.  The rules of membership are clear, you don't have to be Jewish, or even support unwarranted military spending, but if you're not a Militant Zionist, you can't be a neocon….!

"Reading what Mortimer Zuckerman the head of US News and World Report felt was his obligation to control information appearing in the news media on behalf of his personal and religious beliefs was a truly rare quotebut this book is full of such zingers!"

"I didn't know that Richard Perle's ultimate goal was to fill the policy channels with the equivalent of doughy, cheap, fast food.  He truly represents the 'Domino's Pizza' of policy making.  Filling and unhealthy garbage that clogs the arteries of America and the World."

"Comparing the neoconservative movement to an organized crime syndicate is both brilliant and illustrative."

"There is so much debunking of neoconservative mythology with hard facts in this book.  I can't wait to see the book's authors on C-SPAN."

"This book is a well-written indictment of neoconservative operations in the US.  Hopefully, real criminal indictments will follow."

"I didn't understand how Jack Abramoff's arms trafficking to illegal West Bank settlers was at its core, part of a larger neoconservative ethnic cleansing operation."

Excerpt from "Deadly Dogma: How Neoconservatives Broke the Law to Deceive America", available in bookstores March 15, 2006.   ISBN # 09764437-4-0

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